Abstract. Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given ®nite alphabet, has an equilibrium payo¨.
Introduction
This paper proves the existence of equilibrium payo¨s for incomplete information repeated two person games with symmetric random signals.
The ®rst study, in the deterministic zero sum case, is due to Kohlberg and Zamir (1974) . They show the existence of a value by reducing the problem to the study of stochastic games with absorbing states (Kohlberg, 1974) . This result was then extended in two directions: by Forges (1982) to the zero-sum random signal case and by Neyman and Sorin (1997) to the deterministic non zero sum case.
The framework is given by a ®nite set K of states and for each state k in K, by a bi-matrix game G k de®ned by I Â J real valued payo¨ matrices A k Y B k and I Â J ``signalling matrices'' H k with values in the set hH of probabilities on a ®nite set H.
For any initial distribution p on K, the game qp is played as follows. First, the state k in K is chosen once for all according to p. The value of k is not announced to the players. Then there is in®nite number of stages where at stage n, player I (resp. player II ) chooses i n e I (resp. j n e J). The payo¨ at that stage is thus a k i n Y j n Y b k i n Y j n (for player I and II respectively), but is not announced. Rather the players are told a ``public signal'' h n whose conditional distribution given the past is H k i n Y j n . For the signal to contain all the information of the players at that stage and for perfect recall to hold, the signal reveals the moves:
The result
Any pair of strategies s of player 1 and t of player 2, together with the initial probability p, de®nes a probability distribution P pYsYt on plays
and therefore it also induces a probability distribution on the stream of payo¨s
be the expected payo¨ of player 1 at stage t, and set x n sY t 1an n t1 x t sY t to be the average expected payo¨ of player 1 up to stage n and similarly for player 2.
A history of length m is a sequence
Such histories generate an algebra F m on the set K Â I Â J Â H y . p m1 is the conditional distribution on K given F m induced by P pYsYt . Therefore any pair of strategies de®nes a martingale p m , m 1Y 2Y F F F (with p 1 p), which re¯ects the information (equivalently the uncertainty) that the players have at each stage m about the state k in K.
A payo¨ vector aY b e R 2 is an e-equilibrium payo¨ if there exist strategies s of player 1 and t of player 2 and a positive integer N Ne such that for any pair of strategies, s H of player 1 and t H of player 2, and any n N,
and y n sY t e b b b y n sY t H À e 2 (see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), p. 403) . Such a pair of strategies, s of player 1 and t of player 2, is called an euniform equilibrium with payo¨ aY b. An alternative equivalent property is that there exist N Ne, such that for all nY m N and every strategy pair, s H of player 1 and t H of player 2,
The above de®nition implies that any e-uniform equilibrium with payo¨ aY b induces in fact an e-equilibrium with payo¨ within e of aY b in any su½ciently long game, or in any game with large enough discount factor. E e denotes the set of all e-uniform equilibrium payo¨ vectors in q p. The set of equilibrium payo¨s in q p, E 0 p, is de®ned as U eb0 E e p. Note that E 0 p is not empty if and only if, for every e b 0, there exists an e-uniform equilibrium.
Theorem. For any two person repeated game with symmetric information qp, E 0 p is non empty.
Examples
We ®rst illustrate by two examples the way information propagates and then give some hints of the proof.
The ®rst example deals with a zero sum game and is taken from Mertens (1982) . The state space is K fLY MY Rg and the initial probability p on K is uniform. The payo¨s are given by
and the signals by
The value of each matrix is obviously 0. Moreover if (Top, Left) is played, lm will occur with probability 2/3 and r with probability 1/3. In this second case, the game R is revealed and one can assume that the payo¨ from then on is 0. Otherwise the game from this stage on is LM, with initial prior (1/2,1/2,0); the moves are non revealing except (Top, Right) which is completely revealing and thus leads to the payo¨ 0. Hence the analysis of game LM reduces to the analysis of the following 0 0* 1 2 where a star Ã denotes an absorbing payo¨. This stochastic game has value 1. A similar analysis applies if (Top, Left) is played. Finally if player 1 plays Bottom, there is no change in information on K and the payo¨ is the expectation. The initial game thus is asymptotically equivalent to the following
which is again a stochastic game with absorbing states, hence has a value (Kohlberg, 1974) . A similar reduction applies to any game in the zero-sum deterministic case (Kohlberg and Zamir, 1974) . Note that the conditional probability on the state space can take only a ®nite number of values and when its value changes its support decreases. Thus an induction analysis based on the size of K is available. In the non zero sum deterministic case a similar procedure is feasible (Neyman and Sorin, 1997) , replacing the value by an equilibrium in the reduced game with absorbing states (Vrieze and Thuijsman, 1989) . The second example is a one person decision problem where the decision maker is uninformed, in the spirit of a ``bandit problem'', with payo¨s given by
and signals satisfying
Assume a uniform initial probability. The player will ®rst play Top during a large number of periods then optimally in the revealed game. In fact the martingale of posteriors given Top, p a 2a3Y 1a3Y p aa H 1a2Y 1a2Y p aa 4a5Y 1a5Y F F F will converge, hence in this case reach the boundary with probability one. Here again the natural state space is the set of posterior probabilities but it is unbounded. Note that in this case the player has in fact an optimal strategy: play Top on an in®nite set of stages with zero density and optimally in the one stage game given the statistical information otherwise, but recall that already in two person zero sum games with absorbing states, optimal strategies may not exist (Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968) . When 2 players are present, they both control the martingale and a backwards analysis based on the limit points is impossible. In the previous examples, e-equilibrium strategies at stage m depend only on the posterior at that stage. In the general case the computation of e-optimal strategies will take into account the current value of the martingale of posterior probabilities and the number of stages where this value has changed. In fact the ®niteness assumption on I and J implies that for any positive e and any strategy pair, there is ®nite a number of jumps, say M, after which, with probability greater than e, the martingale will be within e of the boundary, hence the possibility of an induction analysis.
Explicitly the strategies will be constructed as follows: at the M th jump, choose in the boundary of hK a closest point p Ã to the current value p of the martingale and play an equilibrium in qp Ã from this stage on. This de®nes payo¨s eMY p. Inductively payo¨s emY p are de®ned on hK after m jumps m M. After m À 1 jumps, the players play at p equilibrium strategies in the stochastic game where the payo¨ is the average if the posterior does not change and is, after a jump, absorbing and equals to emY p H where p H is the current posterior. Hence the state space will be a product hK Â f1Y 2Y F F F Y Mg, like in the picture below.
The proof a) Preliminaries
The proof is by induction on the number of elements in the support of p, hence we assume E 0 p H j for p in the boundary bhK of hK.
We assume without loss of generality that all payo¨s are bounded in absolute value by 1. Therefore E 0 p H j if and only if E 0 p À1Y 1 Â À1Y 1 H j. Note also that a Lipschitz property holds: the payo¨s induced by a pair of strategies in qp and q p H di¨er by at most kp À p
In particular an e-uniform equilibrium in qp is an e kp À p
Then the non-emptiness of E 0 p for p e bhK implies that E d p À1Y 1 2 is also non empty for p e hnh d K.
b) The posterior distribution
Let q pY iY j be the distribution of the posterior probability on hK, when the prior is p and the moves played by the players are iY j. Formally, de®ne ®rst Let NR denote the subset of I Â J for which qpY iY j is the constant p, for all p. These are the non revealing entries where the signal h is non informative and the posterior does not change. The set of revealing entries, I Â JnNR, is denoted by R.
From the de®nition of R and the fact that I and J are ®nite we deduce that h b 0 such that ip e h d K and iiY j e R,
c) The auxiliary games
We introduce now a new state space K hK Â f0Y 1Y F F F Y Mg, where M is an integer to be ®xed later and we de®ne inductively mappings Y from K to [À1, 1] as follows: sMY pY tMY p are d-uniform equilibrium strategies with payo¨s MY pY MY p in the game q p for p e hnh d K (which exist by the induction hypothesis on the number of elements in the support of p and the above remark). We write n 1 for the corresponding Nd (see (1), (2)). The strategy pair is arbitrarily de®ned for p e h d K and MY pY MY p are taken to be 0 there.
For l 0Y 1Y F F F Y M À 1 and p e hnh d K, let lY pY lY p MY pY MY p. Now for l 0Y 1Y F F F Y M À 1 and p e h d K we de®ne by backward procedure the game with absorbing payo¨s GlY p played on I Â J and where the iY j entry is:
where as usual a Ã denotes an absorbing payo¨. By the theorem of Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) (see also Mertens, Sorin and Zamir, 1994, p. 406±408) these games have e 0 -uniform equilibria strategies slY pY tlY p with payo¨s lY pY lY p. Moreover, the Lipschitz property allows to choose the e 0 -uniform equilibria strategies slY pY tlY p so that the positive integers Ne 0 Y lY p associated with them (see (1), (2)) are independent of p and l, and we thus denote n 2 Ne 0 Y lY p.
d) The equilibrium strategies
On the space of plays we de®ne W l to be the stopping time corresponding to the l-th time a revealing entry is played, l 1Y F F F Y M and y to be the entrance time in hKnh d K. Let T l minW l Y y.
We now construct a pair of strategies s Ã Y t Ã in qp as follows: s Ã Y t Ã coincides with s0Y pY t0Y p until time T 1 . Note that the hypothesis on the support of the signals implies that standard signalling holds in q p and thus the strategies are well de®ned. Then, inductively given the past history o
e) The payo¨s Fix a positive integer n which is greater than n 0 maxn 1 Y n 2 , and de®ne the stopping times S l minT l Y nY l 1Y F F F Y MY S 0 0. Set al lY pl and let H l be the algebra of histories up to stage S l . The de®nition of s Ã and t Ã implies that for every l 0Y F F F Y M À 1, and for every strategy s of player 1,
and
for every strategy s of player 1. Remark that
Note also that the event fpM e h d Kg is included in the event fT M `yg. Taking expectation in inequalities (4), (5), and summing the resulting equations over l 0Y F F F Y M À 1 we deduce that
na0 À e 0 nM n 0 MX Adding to the above two inequalities the expectation of inequalities (6) and (7) respectively and using (8) we conclude that
f ) The bound on M
Recall that p m1 denotes the posterior probability on hK given F m , the algebra generated by the histories
and denote by G m the corresponding s-algebra. From (3) it follows that h b 0 such that for every strategy pair sY t:
for any L. Hence, for any e b 0, there exists M such that, for any pair of strategies in q p,
Given e b 0, choose d ea4, and let M be determined by eY h and inequality (11). Then let e 0 ea4M and ®nally de®ne Ne 4n 0 M 1ae. By (9) and (10), s Ã Y t Ã is an e-uniform equilibrium in q p with payo¨ a0Y b0. 9
Comments and open problems
The proof by Forges (1982) in the zero-sum case with random signals uses an auxiliary game to construct an operator H on (continuous) functions on hK, such that if a player can guarantee some function u, he can also guarantee Hu: the value of the game where the revealing entries are absorbing with payo¨ induced by u at the relevant posterior. Then an increasing sequence of functions u n y n1 Y u n1 maxHu n Y u n , and dually functions w n are de®ned. One proves that the limit of both sequences are the same and de®ne the value of the in®nitely repeated game (see also Mertens and Zamir 1971±1972) . Obviously this approach relies on the zero-sum aspect through the monotonicity of the value operator and therefore cannot be extended to the non-zero sum case. On the other hand, our construction gives an alternative proof to Forges's result. One should note that an argument related to the ®nite number of ``interior jumps'' of the martingale of posteriors was mentioned in the concluding remarks of her paper.
The result of the present paper extends easily to the case where H and K are countable. However ®niteness assumptions on I and J are crucial for (3) to hold.
To conclude, recall that this research is part of a general program which aims to characterize the information structures for which equilibrium payo¨s exist.
For two person games with lack of information on one side, existence has been recently proved by Simon, Spiez and Torunczyk (1995) .
Note that in the framework of lack of information on both sides, already in the zero sum case the value may not exist, see Aumann and Maschler (1995) .
This paper provides a positive answer for a class of two person non-zero sum games with symmetric incomplete information. A proof for the n person case would follow in the same way from the proof of existence of equilibria for n person games with absorbing states.
